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The petition Jor rehearing lists six alleged errors of this
court as a basis lor rehearing. For practical purposes the
said alleged errors may be classified into two groups namely,
first: Alleged error of this court in upholding the decision
of the lower court that the estate of Richard H. Spencer
rather than J olm Edison Spencer is entitled to the residue of
'1<8 ;;harPs o£ Class "A" stock in Indianola Irrigation Company
represented hy Ce; tilicates No. 72 and No. 73; and, second:
Alleged error o:· this court in not <·!early a,;sessing ('O~b
hetwef'n tiH~ parties.

We shall ('Oll<'crn ourselves primarily with an attempt
to !lleet the argllnwnt of counsel concerning the first named
question, for W(" Jed that i£ this court rightfully denies a
rehearing upon that basis it would hardly be justifif'd in
granting a rel1earing merely for the purpose of clarifying the
question of cost,;.

Couns!·l for appellants contends that Johu Edison Spencer
and not the ~~,.tatf' oi. l\ !chard H. Spencer is enitled to the
said residue of ;1,g clun•·' of water. and as a basis for the
contention he ::! tcm pis t: 1 draw an analogy between the
manner in whi•:h John Edison Spencer allegedly acquired
title thereto and the method whereby the 55 shares of water
passed through H ugentobler to Que Jensen, and the manner
in which the title t<J the (JO shares of water was acquired hy
James C. Whiaaker, and the manner in which the title to
the 285 shares of sock in the Indianola Irrigation Company
passed through the Federal Building and Loan Association
to its present owners. Howewr, we shall show that sueh
analogy cloes not in fact exist.

The deed to John Edison Spencer upon which appellants
rely for their claim to the 48 shares of Class "A" stock in
Indianola Irrigation Company, conveys the land "together
with 80 acres of water in what is known as Thistle Creek."
There is no other or further conveyance, or judgment, or
decree, or proceeding whatever vesting title to the water
shares in question in John Edison Spencer. ln £act the evi·
dence shows, and the trial court so held, and this court
has sustained the trial court\ findings tlu~reon, that Richard
H. Spencer treated CertiJicatt~c Nos. 72 and 73 as his own
property, that Certificates Nos. 72 and 73 were endorsed
by Richard H. Spencer to L ;\1. Price as security for a debt
which was later paid ( tr. 668) ; and that the purpose of exchanging Certificate No. 57 :for Certificates Nos. 72 and
73 was to enable Hichard H. Spencer to secure two small
loans, which could more readily be obtained than one large
one ( tr. 629). There is no evidence in the record that John
Edison Spencer ever exercised dominion over the water
stock rPpresented hy Certificates Nos. 72 and 7:~, or that
he was ever the owner of the said stot;k. In fact, it appears
to he clear that his name was used only as a ennvemence or
as an accommodation to his fathPr.

By way of contrast between the facts surronnding the
,;tock claimed by the appellant and the facts with respect to
the other water stock, we respectfully call attention to the
fact that the 55 shares of water now decreed to be the property of Que Jensen were mortgaged by the owner in 1922 to
Simon Hugentobler, the mortgage was subsequently foreclosed and the water stock was sold at foreclosure sale to
llugentobler, and thereafter Que Jensen, by mesne conyevances, became the owner thereof. As this honorable court

;-;tated in its dt>cisi1;11, "For all practical purposes, It IS conceded hy aU parties concerned that Que Jensen is entitled to
SS shares or acre~ of primary rights. The only question
which ari~es as lo him, is that of determining from which
stock certificate his shares are to be deducted. This matter,
however, was determined in Case No. 2888 * * * * ." As
compared to a mortgage, a decree of foreclosure, a foreclosure snle and ~heriff's deed, in the case of 55 shares of
water claimed hy Que Jensen, the appellant here claims the
Indianola Wetter ~lock upon the simple basis of a Warranty
Deed given ]Jy Hichard H. Spencer conveying certain land
"together with 80 acres of water in what is known as Thistle
Creek," the "aid deed having been made at a time when
the grantor owned WJ shares whatever in Thistle Creek, having theretofore conveyed more shares of such water than he
owned, and neither Richard H. Spencer nor the administrator of his estal.l' has since acquired any shares whatever
in Thistle Creek or i:s tributaries directly. Surely there is
no analogy hclwcen the hasis o£ the claim of Que Jensen and
that of John Edison :~pencer.

Tfw ,.;mn<' principl(·,; lwreinahove (~tmmerated apply with
respect to the alleged clllalogy between the claims of Johu
Edison Spencer and thi)sc of Whittaker, with this additional
factor: The mortgage to tlw hank commissioner upon which
Whittaker's claim i:-; based n~cited specifically "60 shares
or acres of water right owned by Richard H. Spencer in the
waters of Indianola Creek, Thistle and Rock Creek." The
same principles likewise apply with respect to the alleged
analogy between the basis o£ the claim of John Edison
Spencer and that of the present successor to the water stock
mortgaged to Fedt'ral Building and Loan Association, with

Lhis additional factor: The latter mortgage specifically
described "285 shares o£ capital stock in the Indianola
Irrigation Company, a corporation."
The sole hasis for the appellant's application for rehearing boils down to his contention that because Richard H.
Spencer made a Warranty Deed to John Edison Spencer
conveying certain land "together with 80 acres of water in
what io, known as Thistle Creek," even though the grantor
had no right or title to any such water at the time the deed
was made, the grantee now has a valid title to any water
rights that Richard H. Spencer may subsequently acquire.
Counsel in his hrief for rehearing, at the outset, states: "We
shall not in our argument in support of our petition, reargue
the que~tion of the appurtenaney of the water to the land,"
and then seeks to accomplish the same purpose by arguing
in substanr:e that because a Warranty Deed conveys after
acquired title, therefore. this \Varranty Deed automatically
conveys to the grantee the shares of Indianola Irrigation
Company stock which subsequently passed to the administrator of tlw t~slatt~ of Richard H. Spencer.
The appellant's t:untention in this regard is based solely
upon Seuion 78-1-9, Utah Code Annotated, 191.3, which
reads ac; follow,.;:

"'If <Ill) pcr,.;on ,.;hall ht~reafter convey <lilY real eslale
by cmJ~eyance purporting to convey the ~arne. in fee simple
absolute, and shall not at the time of such conveyance
have the leg a I estate in such real estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same, the legal estate subsequently
at:quired shall immediately pass to the grantee, his heirs,
,;uccessors or assigns, and such conveyance shall be as

if such legal estate had been in the grantor at the time of
the conveyance."

It will be noted that this section applies specifically and
exclusively to real estate. The Utah statutes do not contain
any comparable provision with respect to personal property.
The trial court held, and this court aflirmed such holding,
that the shares of water in controversy are not appurtenant
to the land, and the appellant has specifically stated that
he will not reargue this question, yet he seeks to accomplish
the same purpose by urging the doctrine of estoppel by deed
as having the effect of transferring automatically to him certain shares of stock oJ the Indianola Irrigation Company,
which were strictly personal property, and which were not
specifically recited in the deed. We submit that the only way
that the estoppel could apply to the water stock in questi,;:J
would be upon the basis that the said water ,;tock w:1-.;
appurtenant to the land.
In order to apply the doctrine contended Jor hy the
appellant this court mu~t first ignore all of the evidence in the
case tending to show that Richard H. Spencer treated the
water stock as his own, and that the purpo~e of tht~ exchange
of Certificate No. 57 for Certificates Nos. 72 and 73 was to
enable Richard H. Spencer to secure two small loans instead
of one. Then, having concluded that the water stdck is not
appurtenant to the land, the court would have to conclude
that the Indianola Irrigation stock is the identical stock as
that described in the Warranty Deed as "80 acres of water
in what is known as Thistle Creek." This, of course, obviously
is not the fact. Then the court would next have to conclude that the law in Utah with respeet to the doctrine of
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estoppel by deed applies with equal force to personalty. If
the legislature had intended that the doctrine set forth m
Section 78-1-9 of Utah Code Annotated, 1943, applied to
personal property it could easily have so stated. The appellant in his brief has cited some general law on this question
as well as a few specific cases, but no cases have been cited
in support of his view in this jurisdiction, and we have looked
m vain for any such cases.
There is, m fact, sounrl hasis in reason and logic for
holding that the rule cannot he applierl with equal force to conveyances of personal property as to those of real property.
The rule in England, in which jurisdiction the common
law had its inception, is well stated in the case of Bryans v.
Nix, R M & W. 775. 150 Reprint 1634, 1642:

"It is proper, howevn, to notice the very ingenious argument used on the part of the plaintiffs, founded on
the doctrine of estoppel, as applied to real estate. If a
man, by indenture, demise a certain manor which he has
not, and then purchases the manor, and afterwards sells
or demises to B., the first lease operates against the purchaser or second lessee; and by analogy to this case, it
is contended that the first bill of lading was good for
the plaintiffs by estoppel, against the master, and consignor; and against the defendant, who claims that
cargo which was put on board under the consignor. But
this analogy does not hold; in the case of real property,
the lease is a conclusive admission by the lessor, that he
has a title to the specific estate demised, which binds a
subsequent purchaser of that estate; here the bill of lading
is a conclusive admission only that some oats, amounting
to the specified quantity, were on board. In the former
case, the estate is identified and ascertained at the time
of the arlmission; in the latter. no property existerl to

which the admission applied, for no oats were on hoard;
and they are not otherwise ascertained, than by that
statement that they were on hoard; and the person who
afterwards purchases any oats from the consignor, might
as well he said to purchase those to which the estoppel
relates, as he who purchases those which were afterwards
put on hoard. And besides, it may well he doubted
whether the doctrine of estoppel applies to personal
chattels at all, so as to hind a subsequent purchaser of
them."
It should also he born in mind that there is no magic, with
respect to the doctrine contended for by appellants, in a
Warranty Deed. There are numerous leading cases whidt
hold that there is no estoppel when a deed, even with the
strongest of covenants, purports to convey and warrant
merely the present inlt~rest of the grantor. SonH~ 0 r tht~SC C:tc;es
are the following:
Hanrid( v. Patrick, 7 S.Ct. 117, 119 U.S. 1:)6, :)0 L.Ed.
:396;
Tillotson v. Kennedy, 5 Ala. 1.07, ;)9 Am. Dec. :t)O:
Porter v. Henderson, 82 So. 668, 203 Ala. :312;
Kimball v. Sample, 25 Cal. 4/1.0;
Holbrook v. Debo, 99 Ill. 372;
Stephenson v. Boody, 38 N.E. :3:31, 139 fnd. 60;
Loomis v. Pingree, 43 Me. 299;
Comstock v. Smith. ] 3 Pick., Mass., 1] 6, 23 Am. D. 670;
Bogy v. Shoah, 13 Mos. 365;
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Bell v. Twilight, 26 N.H. 401;
Adams v. Ross, 30 N.J.L. 505, 82 Am. Dec. 237;
White v. Brocaw, 14 Ohio St. 339;
Wynn v. Harman, 5 Grat. ( 46 Va.) 157;
Western Min., etc., Co. v. Peytona Cannel Coal Co., 8
W.Va. 406;
21

c..r. ] 084,

notf' !1<9.

It should be noted in this connection that although the
deed to John Edison Spencer upon which he relies for his
claim was a Warranty Deed, there is nothing in the language
of that instrument which purports to represent that the grantor owned any shares of Indianola Irrigation Company stock,
nor is there anything therein inconsistent with the premisf~
that the grantor conveyed merely such interest in "80 acres of
water in what is known as Thistle Creek" as the grantor then
owned.
We also point Ollt that the principle of title by e~toppel,
or feeding the estoppel, has been lwld to have no application
in cases where the grantor afterwards acquires title through
an independent source. McCune v. McCune ( 1937) 23 Cal.
App. (2d) 295, 72 P (2d) 883; Schultz v. Cities Serv.
Oil Co. (1939) 149 Kan. 148,86 P(2d) 533; Federal Land
Hank v. Johnson (193.~) 205 NC 180, ] 70 SE 658.
In conclusion we respectfully submit that, there being
reasonable evidence to sustain the decision of the trial court
on the points argued in appellants' petition for rehearing,
and this court having sustained the finding of the trial court

lO
thereon, the appellants have not shown sufficient cause for
the granting of a rehearing in this matter, and that the
decision of this court heretofore made should stand.
Respectfully submitted,

ROMNEY & NELSON
Attorneys for Richard Leo Spencer,
Administrator of the estate of Richard H. Spencer, deceased.

